[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: Kerberos/LDAP/SASL central authentication server howto
Nikola,
If you look athe the slapd.conf help you find:
sasl-secprops <properties>
Used to specify Cyrus SASL security properties.
The none flag (without any other properities)
causes the flag properites default,
"noanonymous,noplain", to be cleared. The noplain
flag disables mechanisms susceptible to simple
passive attacks. The noactive flag disables
mechanisms susceptible to active attacks. The
nodict flag disables mechanisms susceptible to
passive dictionary attacks. The noanonyous flag
disables mechanisms which support anonymous login.
The forwardsec flag require forward secrecy between
sessions. The passcred require mechanisms which
pass client credentials (and allow mechanisms which
acceptable security strength factor as an integer
approximate to effective key length used for
encryption. 0 (zero) implies no protection, 1
implies integrity protection only, 56 allows DES or
other weak ciphers, 112 allows triple DES and other
strong ciphers, 128 allows RC4, Blowfish and other
modern strong ciphers. The default is 0. The
maxssf=<factor> property specifies the maximum
acceptable security strength factor as an integer
(see minssf description). The default is INT_MAX.
The maxbufsize=<size> property specifies the
maximum security layer receive buffer size allowed.
0 disables security layers. The default is 65536.
I tried to use the -O minssf=128 with ldapsearch against AD, but get a failure although I use the latest heimdal library which supports
rc4-hmac. I can see that I have an arcfour-hmac-md5 ticket for the ldap/server principal and would assume that rc4-hmace allows the
higher encryption.
Any ideas why not ?
Thanks
Markus
On Tue, 10 Aug 2004 10:54 , Nikola Milutinovic <Nikola.Milutinovic@ev.co.yu> sent:
>This is a cross-post to Cyrus INFO list. The question raised here is
>whether GSS-API and *-MD5 SASL mechanisms secure the entire
>communication, not just the authentication phase, thus making SSL/TLS
>unnecessary.
>
>Tarjei Huse wrote:
>
>>>>?? I didn't know , sorry. Please tell me more on how I can use GSSAPI instead of
>>>>tls to secure not only authentication but everything that happens over the
>>>>wire.
>>>
>>>It really depends on the client tool. Not only does GSSAPI provide this, DIGEST-MD5
>>>also.
>
>Never heard of this. I was always under the impression that both GSS-API
>and *-MD5 methods secured only the authentication, not the entire
>channel data transfer.
>
>>>Examples of such tools that I'm 100% aware of are ldapsearch and mutt when doing SASL
>>>authentication.
>>>
>>>With ldapsearch, for example:
>>>$ ldapsearch -h ldap.server | head -5
>>>SASL/GSSAPI authentication started
>>>SASL username: andreas@DISTRO.CONECTIVA
>>>SASL SSF: 56
>
>No. It simply means that authentication type is of SSF (Security
>Strength Factor) 56. I'm not sure if the SSF has anything to do with
>number of bits used as (some) private key length. Anyway, this is saying
>nothing about the rest of the communication, just the authentication part.
>
>>>SASL installing layers
>>>(...)
>>>
>>>With digest-md5:
>>>$ ldapsearch -h ldap.server -Y digest-md5 | head -5
>>>SASL/DIGEST-MD5 authentication started
>>>Please enter your password:
>>>SASL username: andreas
>>>SASL SSF: 128
>
>Again, just the auth phase is covered here.
>
>I'm crossposting to the SASL mailing list in hopes someone can shed some
>light on the matter.
>
>Nix.
--
Markus Moeller <huaraz@moeller.plus.com>