[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [OpenAFS-devel] Re: MEMORY credential cache interop between Heimdal and MIT?




On Aug 30, 2007, at 12:39 AM, u+openafsdev-sr55@chalmers.se wrote:

> Hi,
>
> I happen to have an opinion,
> based on years with AFS, DCE/DFS and Coda, fwiiw.

Everyone's entitled to an opinion as long as they realize they're  
wrong if they disagree with mine.  ;-)

> On Wed, Aug 29, 2007 at 02:08:48PM -0700, Henry B. Hotz wrote:
>> (Process Authentication Group) problem the same way we solve the
>> secure credential cache problem.  PAGs have better semantics than any
>> extant Kerberos ccache implementation.
>
> This is a questionable statement.

Of course it is.  It's my opinion.  ;-)

> PAGs are supposed to be handy, but they contradict the basic *nix  
> design,
> which is built around uid as the main credential.
> So they are controversial by nature.

The basic *nix design was oriented toward single multiuser machines.   
The uid is completely useless as a credential for accessing network  
resources.  Perhaps PAGs contradict the design, but that's because  
the design is not applicable.  Obviously that has user-visible  
effects, but I see no issue there except that the user needs to learn  
the difference.  (Or are you proposing that Unix should be updated to  
use a network-verifiable identity in place of the uid?)

> They create lots of confusion, are not as isolating as one might  
> believe
> and eventually reduce security as they are breaking the borders
> of security domains (switching uids while inheriting rights or vice  
> versa).

I agree that the scoping mis-match between uid's and PAGs is a  
security issue.  Likewise the scoping mismatch between PAG's and  
<pick one> Kerberos credential cache's is an issue.  Please propose  
what you think the model should be, but if you say Unix uid's then I  
strenuously disagree.  I happen to think the process inheritance tree  
is a good scope to use, as I described in my post.

How easy/hard that is to break is an implementation issue that I  
would discuss in terms of how well the PAG model was implemented.  As  
others have noted there will always be gaps and holes.  In fact I  
would go one farther and say that Goedel's Theorem absolutely  
guarantees there will be gaps and holes, regardless of what model you  
use.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
The opinions expressed in this message are mine,
not those of Caltech, JPL, NASA, or the US Government.
Henry.B.Hotz@jpl.nasa.gov, or hbhotz@oxy.edu